Youth

and Generation Studies

YGS

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Lectori salutem!

It was most likely in a social media post that I read some advice along these lines: dare to plan ten times greater than you first intended, for otherwise you'll regret not being more ambitious, not dreaming bigger.

Here at the Youth Research Institute, when it first occurred to us to establish some kind of platform to publish our empirical studies and analyses on youth, or, in broader terms different generations and their respective lifestyles and situations, an academic blog seemed appropriate. However, as we deliberated our plans, the concept of an international English-language journal started to form. Launching an international journal is a challenging task that comes with many responsibilities and does not in the least promise the opportunity of overnight success – but it is the mission and responsibility of researchers to pursue tasks such as these. This value is not only shared by my fellow colleagues on the editorial board -- Jennie Bristow, Swikrita Dowerah, and Georgina Kiss-Kozma -- but you would be hard-pressed to find any researcher who would disagree.

So then, what kind of publication will this be? Our Youth and Generation Studies (YGS) journal seeks to be a platform within the field of interdisciplinary social sciences where professionals dealing with and researching youth and generations can express their thoughts, engage in professional debates, and cooperate to expand their knowledge. The goal of this journal is to become a high-quality professional interface for the scientific discourse of youth and generations and to develop into a well-known, recognized periodical publication within the international academic community. Furthermore, YGS also aims to provide a publication opportunity for quality academic research from young academics currently pursuing their doctoral studies. Aside from research materials, YGS will publish recensions, book reviews, and conference reports that fit the theme of the journal as well.

In the first article of Issue 1, Virág Patrícia Rédai and Admilson Veloso da Silva examine the expectations of employers and the communication strategies used for employer branding from a youth perspective.

This issue of our freshly launched publication also features two studies that analyse data regarding the Large Sample Hungarian Youth Survey. This research program, notable on a global level as well, was first conducted in Hungary at the turn of the millennium; every four years since, eight thousand 15- to 29-year-olds are surveyed and representative data is collected on a wide range of topics based on their responses. Georgina Kiss-Kozma and Tamás Ruff, in their study based on the Large Sample Hungarian Youth survey data, analyse the mobility potential of young people. In another study connected to this ongoing survey, István Murányi examines the prejudices of young people in Hungary.

In addition to these studies, we have two book recommendations included in this first issue, both featuring volumes co-published by the Youth Research Institute. The first, by Fanni Radnai, describes a volume of studies addressing the ten most pressing problems concerning young people in Hungary. The second report presents an international compilation of studies as interpreted by Paul Moran, examining the impact of various crises on the youth throughout the world.

We dared to dream big with the launch of Youth and Generations Studies. And now, in the name of my fellow editors, we call upon academics within our sphere of research to join our efforts so that we can continue to dream big together!

Levente Székely
Editor-in-Chief

Hungary's Gen Z Workforce: Analysing Youth Perspectives on Employer Branding and Their Perception of the National Job Market

Virág Patrícia Rédai¹ & Admilson Veloso da Silva²

This paper discusses Generation Z's perception of communication strategies used by companies in Hungary for employer branding and their expectations from prospective employers. The study applies a mixed method approach, with qualitative and quantitative techniques that combine six focus group interviews and an online survey with young people aged 18 to 26 (N = 156). Our findings indicate that Generation Z favors workplace values over salaries and expects personalized job descriptions and a deep understanding of company culture, usually acquired with peers or at job fairs. However, different subgroups within Generation Z have varying job preferences and motivations. Finally, these findings offer insights into employer branding strategies that can contribute to companies in Hungary to attract and retain younger workers.

1. Introduction

The contemporary Hungarian job market has been characterized by continual transformations over the past 50 years, with changes in the political regime in the 1990s, ascension to the European Union, and more recently with the COVID-19 pandemic. Parallelly, new generations have become part of the workforce, making it imperative to gain a comprehensive understanding of the expectations, beliefs, and experiences of emerging generations. Particularly, the Hungarian job market is now opening its doors to Generation Z, born between 1997 and 2012 (Tari, 2010), distinguished by their unique values and expectations in contrast to preceding generations (Downs, 2019). To effectively engage and retain this generation, employers must grasp their distinctive priorities and preferences.

Communication strategies are essential in addressing the varied preferences of different generational cohorts, encompassing aspects such as frequency, style, speed, and channels (Edwards, 2020). In the contemporary labor market, four generations coexist: Baby Boomers (1946-1964), Generation X (1965-1980), Millennials (1981-1996), and Generation Z (1997-2012), each characterized by distinct communication preferences (Downs, 2019). Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has precipitated shifts in working culture, prompting changes in communicative practices and expectations (de Lucas Ancillo et al., 2020).

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3 This publication is based on Rédai's TDK paper, supervised by Veloso, which won the first place in the Communication and Media Science section of the 2023 local competition at Corvinus University of Budapest.

This research initiative seeks to investigate Generation Z's perceptions of communication strategies employed by companies in Hungary through social media channels for employer branding, as well as their expectations of prospective workplaces. Employing a methodological framework that combines personal focus group interviews (Morgan, 1997) with an online survey (Dillman et al., 2014), this study sampled participants from the active Hungarian labor market who belong to Generation Z. Consequently, this research employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches to comprehensively explore the phenomenon, ensuring a consistent sample size for analysis. Statistical analysis is applied to the quantitative data, while narrative analysis (Riessman, 1993) is employed for the qualitative data.

The study's research questions center on the significance of flexibility and work-life balance in Generation Z's decision-making processes, the factors influencing their workplace preferences, their expectations concerning job advertisements, and the credibility of sources they rely on for information about potential employers. The findings obtained from both the survey and focus group interviews reveal the trend toward earlier employment among younger members of Generation Z, and that different subgroups within the group have varying job preferences and motivations to start working. In the next subsections, we define and discuss characteristics that mark the studied young generation, as well as how employer branding has developed over the past years and its role in companies' communication strategies.

Generation characteristics

Generations are defined as people within a delineated population who experience the same significant events within a given time (Pilcher, 1994). According to Tari (2010), there are four main generations currently in the job market, corresponding to Baby Boomers (1946-1964), Generation X (1965-1980), Generation Y (1981-1996), Generation Z (1997-2012). According to John Palfrey and Urs Gasser (2008), there is a shared cultural connection among youth, whose life is predominantly influenced and mediated by digital technologies. As they have come of age in the digital era, they do not relate to a time when analogical forms of communication were predominant.

However, this younger group has been addressed with distinct nomenclatures across the body of literature, thus without consensus to delimit an age or social behavior and cultural practices that would unify them. Hence, we observe multiple terminologies to relatively similar groups, which can vary between authors, including Generation Z – born between 1993 and 2005 (Turner, 2013) or born from 1997 onward (Dimock, 2019; Tari, 2010), Net Generation – born in the internet age (Tapscott, 1998; 2009), Digital Generation (used by Livingstone, 2018, without a specific age limit), among others.

Therefore, in this research, we refer to the studied public as Generation Z for practical reasons based on their age and the phenomenon we analyze, but we acknowledge the multiple classifications that this generation receives. The name "Z" derives from the English word "zappers", in reference to technology usage behaviour, but they are also part of distinct demographics and share social habits. For instance, Ferincz and Szabó (2012) indicate that young people were born in mostly one-child families, thus reflecting a more isolated environment for growing up where many didn't have direct siblings to "team play". Additionally, they started school earlier in life and distinct digital devices

(i.e., TVs, videogames, computers, smartphones) were part of their daily activities. Therefore, they have become "socially, technologically the most independent, most empowered generation of all time" (Ferincz & Szabó, 2012). Moreover, Tari (2011) describes that young people can multitask and perform many parallel projects, but this may result in difficulties with memorization and reduced attention span.

Market research data indicates that 26 percent of the global population belongs to Generation Z (Wise, 2023), while companies around the world are faced with challenges in recruiting and retaining workers of this group (Wingard, 2021). Therefore, employers must regularly adapt their branding strategies to effectively address the problem and communicate with the younger workforce. Additionally, another study from the Pew Research Center (Parker & Igielnik, 2020) indicated that younger workers were more vulnerable to job loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The study shows that nearly 50 percent of Gen Z-ers reported being affected by financial changes brought about by the coronavirus, resulting in themselves or someone in their household losing work or having to reduce their income as a consequence of the pandemic.

In Hungary, the job posting platform Zyntern.com (Túri, 2021) conducted a survey during the COVID-19 pandemic to investigate the needs and wants of Generation Y and Z (N = 4,000) who were about the enter the market. Most respondents (32 percent) informed that they would like to work at their first job for up to 5 years, followed by those who consider staying between one and two years (24.8 percent) or around three years (23.7 percent). The research also reveals that young people value a positive workplace atmosphere when choosing where to apply for, and prefer responsible, independent work and creative development over tasks that do not involve much responsibility. In the next section, we discuss some challenges and opportunities for companies to communicate with Generation Z, while discussing aspects of employer branding.

Employer branding

Employer branding refers to a concept rooted in marketing principles that involve shaping Human Resources (HR) practices for current and potential employees, thus mixing communication and HR characteristics. This type of branding treats current and potential employees as the target audience to generate a positive employer reputation and result in more competitiveness when attracting or recruiting new hires or reducing turnover (Figurska & Matuska, 2013). In this sense, employer branding "entails controlling a company's image as viewed through the eyes of its associates and potential hires" (Martin & Beaumont, 2003:15).

The success of employer branding strategies is influenced by many factors. For instance, adapting to changes in the economy and client demands is essential for gaining a competitive advantage, according to Figurska and Matuska (2013). Demographic shifts, evolving HR competencies, and employee attitudes are also relevant, particularly concerning the challenges of attracting and retaining top talent in a declining working-age population with varying perceptions of work importance. Furthermore, globalization has become another relevant factor in employer branding, as businesses can operate on a global scale. In connection with that, communication is now more pervasive, as employees may use online platforms to share their opinions with a wide

and international audience about their work experiences and relationships with companies.

In this context of constant changes, the development of an organization's brand could contribute to attracting and retaining young talent who would contribute to the company's mission. To achieve this, Menor (2010) recommends strategies such as maintaining a healthy work-life balance, offering competitive compensation packages, fostering open communication, and eliminating favouritism. Additionally, placing the right employees for each position, recognizing their achievements, and providing workplace flexibility may result in higher employee satisfaction and retention.

Based on Sullivan (2004), there are eight components that could lead to successful employer branding, which are: 1) Creating a culture of sharing and continuous improvement, 2) balancing effective management practices and productivity initiatives, 3) seeking public recognition on lists of great places to work and in local media, 4) motivating employees to share their positive experiences, 5) having managers actively communicate their management techniques, 6) aiming at being a benchmark company with identifiable great practices, 7) increasing awareness of the company's strengths, and 8) incorporating branding assessment metrics into company activities and using the results for continuous development.

Despite these propositions for strategic employer branding, Generation Z brings new challenges for companies, as they tend to be highly tech-savvy and favor quick online communication while struggling with long-term memory. Additionally, previous research (Valentine, 2021) has indicated that these young professionals have different values and priorities than previous generations, focusing more on work-life balance and being realistic or skeptical of employer-employee relationships. However, not much has been investigated in communication science about this generation in Hungary. Therefore, this research investigates how Generation Z perceives communication strategies from companies in Hungary shared on social media for employer branding and what they expect from their prospective workplaces. In the next section, we clarify the methodological approach taken in the study, exposing the data collection and data analysis processes.

2. Research methodology

From a methodological perspective, the study applies six personal focus group interviews (N = 37) with the addition of an online survey (N = 156). The participants were chosen from a pool of members of the Hungarian active labour market who belong to Generation Z (18-25 years old). Thus, the research combines qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the phenomenon in-depth and to gain a consistent sample size for analysis. For the latter, we conducted statistical analysis, while narrative analysis (Riessman, 1993) is used to investigate the qualitative data. In this section, we expose and explain these procedures.

Firstly, focus groups and online surveys are two common data collection methods used in social science research (Dillman et al., 2014). A focus group is a qualitative research technique that involves a small group of participants who take part in a facilitated conversation about a specific subject. A moderator guides the discussion and encourages group members to express their thoughts, opinions, and attitudes. Morgan (1997) explains that this method is frequently used to investigate social and behavioral issues and to learn about preferences and opinions. As for online

surveys, a questionnaire is sent to a target population via the Internet to collect data, enabling quick and effective access to information (Dillman et al., 2014).

These methodologies are efficient for collecting qualitative and quantitative data from a large sample size, thereby enabling researchers to gain valuable insights into a variety of topics. Each method has its own benefits and drawbacks, and researchers frequently combine the two to gain a comprehensive understanding of a subject. According to Morgan et al. (2017), combining surveys and focus groups can help reveal patterns and relationships between variables, which can result in a more complete picture of the research topic. The authors point out that while focus groups can offer insights into the meanings and interpretations of these findings, surveys are useful for comprehending prevalence rates and identifying correlations.

Focus groups

The focus group interviews were conducted in Budapest and involved a total of 37 participants, who were divided into six separate sessions based on their work experience (no experience, less than two years of experience, and more than two years of experience), with each session lasting 90 minutes. To create a comfortable environment for the volunteers, they were provided with snacks and drinks during the discussions. Each focus group interview aimed to consist of six to eight participants, allowing for in-depth discussions on the subject, and there were two sessions for each work category. All interviewees were between the ages of 18 and 25 and were selected from a network of student organizations with which one of the authors worked during the research. The participants were contacted via email and social media and provided with comprehensive information regarding the research.

An assistant took notes during the focus group sessions, and another person moderated the conversation. Word-for-word transcription of the notes ensured that every participant's comment was captured. After that, the notes were arranged and coded to look for any patterns or connections and the responses were categorized into various themes or topics. To analyze the data, we applied narrative analysis (Riessman, 1993), which includes four steps. Firstly, the author advises researchers to fully transcribe interviews before looking for narrative themes in the text. The second step is for researchers to pinpoint the crucial narrative components, such as the plot, characters, and setting. Third, researchers should investigate how these narrative components are connected to one another to form a complete story. Finally, scholars should consider the story's underlying themes and significance.

Survey

After the focus groups stage, we conducted an online survey among the members of a student organization to collect information regarding the opinions and experiences of respondents regarding the Hungarian job market. The survey consisted of 25 multiple-choice (19) and open-ended (6) questions designed on Google Forms that took approximately 10-15 minutes to complete and was open for approximately three weeks, registering 156 responses. The questions focused on a range of topics, including participants' experiences in the job market, their expectations of their

future employers, and the factors that influenced their decision-making process when looking for a job. In this paper, we provide only the results connected to employer branding and communication preferences, in addition to contextual information about the start of their careers.

The gender distribution was split fairly evenly in the group, with only a small percentage indicating they were of another gender. According to the respondent's level of education, the majority were either working towards a bachelor's or master's degree. Additionally, over two-thirds of them had professional experience, demonstrating that they were either actively seeking employment at the time of the survey or already had some professional experience.

Overall:

- 55.8 percent of respondents are aged 22-25, while 44.2 percent are 18-21.

- 51.9 percent of respondents are female, while 46.8 percent are male, and 1.3 percent indicated their gender as other.

- 42.3 percent of respondents are pursuing a master's degree, while 47.4 percent are pursuing a bachelor's degree, and 10.3 percent are no longer attending university.

- 67.3 percent of respondents have professional experience, while 32.7 percent do not.

It is worth noting that the sample was limited to Hungarian respondents only. While this provides insight into the attitudes and beliefs of Hungarian members of Generation Z, it may not be generalizable to other countries or cultures. However, given that the study focused on the Hungarian job market, limiting the sample to Hungarian respondents was appropriate and necessary.

3. Results

The data analysis regarding when Generation Z prefers to start working reveals some trends in their responses. For example, those with work experience indicated that the best time would be in the 5th-6th semester, while those without experience, typically younger, favor the 3rd-4th semester. This suggests that individuals with previous experience may prioritize their studies before entering the job market, which could be due to personal preferences, family expectations, or a desire to concentrate on their studies.

The data also suggests that many of these students have plans to enter the workforce during their 3rd or 4th semester of college. Thus, by focusing efforts on engaging with students early on in their university journey, companies can establish connections and build relationships with prospective employees from Generation Z. This approach allows organizations to proactively communicate their employer brand, values, and career opportunities, therefore capturing the attention and interest of these students as they begin to explore their future career paths.

Figure 1. When is it ideal to start your first professional job?

Figure 2. When is it ideal to start your first professional job?

Contrast between when participants who took part in the survey wish to start working or have started to work (blue: those who have work experience, green: those who do not)

In addition, the participants were also asked about what motivates them to start working in a professional environment. A majority of those who graduated in Budapest or its suburbs were not motivated by financial needs but rather by factors such as gaining experience, peer and family pressure, or the desire for discretionary income. Conversely, a significant portion of respondents from rural areas were motivated by the need to raise money for living costs. These differences in motivations are important for designing job ads and recruitment strategies tailored to different regions or demographics. The variation in motivations can be related to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, with urban graduates potentially focusing on higher-level needs, while rural graduates prioritize physiological and safety needs due to their different environments and opportunities.

The third part of the survey delved into the youth preferences and methods for finding an ideal workplace. It included questions about job search methods, information sources for company research, and factors that matter when looking for a job. This section aimed to provide insights into what matters most to job seekers and how companies can better attract and retain talent. From the data collected, it was discovered that the top five sources for job searches among the participants were 1) recommendations from friends (mentioned by 91 percent of participants), 2) specialized student job agencies (74.4 percent), 3) student organizations (68.6 percent), 4) job fairs (59.6 percent), and 5) LinkedIn (53.2 percent).

Table 1. What motivates you to start working?

WHERE DID YOU ATTEND HIGH SCHOOL?	RAISE MONEY FOR LIVING COSTS	REASONS UNRELATED TO LIVING COSTS	TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
BUDAPEST OR AGGLOMERATION	9.9%	90.1%	*91*
COUNTRYSIDE IN HUNGARY	65.6%	34.4%	*64*

Motivation to start working based on place of study

When asked about the credibility of their source of information regarding the job market, Generation Z values word-of-mouth, with a majority (98 percent) considering a friend or acquaintance working at a company as the most credible content about potential employers. Social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, are classified as more credible than LinkedIn in their opinion. These results demonstrated that respondents still value personal connections and face-to-face encounters when deciding about their careers while seeking testimonies from more informal platforms in comparison to official online channels (i.e., newsletters).

A participant from the focus group with two years of professional experience and a master's degree on the way commented: "I always utilize my network when applying to jobs. I trust my friends' opinion way more than what I can read from a dry job advertisement." Another participant added "In my experience, if you apply without a recommendation, the recruitment process can take months. I applied twice with a referral and the usual time was cut in half." Members of the focus group with no professional experience strongly agreed that "company visits are the best way of truly getting to know who you will be working for. You can get a feel of the place, meet your future colleagues, ask directly about the position and if you're lucky, you can go home with a bunch of freebies." These findings indicate that companies need to invest in their employer branding strategies and put more emphasis on appearing at jobs fairs, and universities or hosting their own career day. Additionally, if companies invest in employer branding, there is a higher chance that Generation Z will find friends' posts about the company online, not only face-to-face.

Participants were asked open-ended questions regarding what they search for in a job description, what they frequently miss from them, and what kind of job descriptions are to their liking. Among the responses, a significant majority of 86 percent expressed frustration with the absence of salary information in job descriptions. A focus group participant with one year of experience expressed that "we do not know what our worth is on the market. There are so many variables and I always get anxious when they ask about my payment expectations. I am scared that if I give the wrong answer, they will not hire me, so I always say a lower number than what I would actually like to get." Other common concerns included not knowing about career advancement opportunities, the availability of work-from-home options, the identity of the supervisor or team members, and information about company culture. Furthermore, many respondents (86.5 percent) expressed a preference for job postings that provide a clear picture of what their work routine will be like, complete with informative details about the company's expectations and goals.

Table 2. What sources are the most credible in terms of job hunting?

	18-21 YEARS OLDS	22-25 YEARS OLDS
OPINION OF A FRIEND WORKING THERE	97.1%	98.9%
COMPANY VISIT OR MEETUP	95.7%	94.3%
VIDEO INTERVIEWS WITH STAFF	71.0%	80.5%
FACEBOOK AND INSTAGRAM POSTS	75.4%	78.2%
COMPANY WEBSITE	62.3%	72.4%
TIKTOK POSTS	75.4%	60.9%
LINKEDIN POSTS	34.8%	72.4%
GLASSDOOR REVIEWS	7.2%	52.9%
COMPANY NEWSLETTER	17.4%	21.8%
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	69	87

Table 2: Generation Z preferred sources of information when job hunting

The survey further revealed that storytelling videos are also popular among job seekers, with 55 percent of participants expressing a preference for them. Storytelling videos offer a representation of the company's culture and values and are an effective way to bring job descriptions to life. In contrast, traditional formal job descriptions were only favoured by 19.9 percent of respondents, highlighting the need for companies to adopt more creative and engaging approaches to job advertisements. As highlighted by a focus group participant who is actively searching for their first job, "I like it when there is more to a job description than just stating what they want from us. I enjoy seeing the faces of people I will be working with and videos that show around the office."

4. Conclusions

This study employed a combination of online surveys and focus group interviews to gain insights into the job preferences and communicative practices of Generation Z in Hungary. The research results emphasized the significance of a personal touch in job descriptions, highlighting Generation Z's desire to understand a company's culture and environment before applying. Moreover, the group demonstrated a preference for communication channels that enable a personal connection with the company, including friend recommendations, job fairs, and company visits. When it comes to social media platforms, they seek information more on informal places – such as Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok – than on professional platforms, such as LinkedIn.

The identified temporal variations in workforce entry preferences among Generation Z, based on prior work experience, demonstrate that these younger workers bring new demands to companies and the market on a general level, challenging established structures that prioritize stability and commitment over flexibility and experimentation. Personal inclinations, familial expectations, and academic bonds need to be considered on many levels, including their daily work-life balance but also how organizations communicate with them. For instance, when creating messages that are directed to this public, marketing and communication professionals need to address their needs and tailor the tone according to the youngsters' expectations.

Furthermore, our research underlines the diversity within Generation Z, with job preferences and motivations varying across age subgroups (i.e., bachelor students want to get experience as soon as possible, while those older students consider it necessary to dedicate more time to their university). Therefore, it demonstrates the relevance of applying employer branding strategies to accommodate these differences within the groups, providing personalized experiences for job seekers that match their communication style.

Finally, the participants also highlighted the need for transparent communication about career growth and opportunities, requiring that companies inform salaries and work routines. In this sense, their demands could also result in a change in how HR professionals disclose strategic information in the job description, moving from more general content to very specific and detailed messages, allowing applicants to decide upfront whether it is a position / company they want to work with or not. Therefore, employer branding professionals must take into consideration both communicational and HR characteristics over time to successfully connect with this new generation, attract them to apply for positions, and also retain qualified talent.

Further studies could be dedicated to providing a cross-country comparative analysis within Central and Eastern Europe, thus exploring how Generation Z in the region perceives employer branding. This could clarify if the patterns perceived in Hungary are limited to national characteristics or if they can also be perceived in neighboring countries, which share some similarities in their history and demographics. Hence, organizations need to remain adaptable and responsive to these generational preferences, as the landscape of recruitment and employer branding continues to evolve.

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Should I Stay or Should I go?
Migration Potential Among Hungarian Youth

Georgina Kiss-Kozma[1] & Tamás Ruff[2]

In our study, we examine the emigration intention of young people in Hungary using the last dataset of the Hungarian youth sociology research project, the Hungarian large sample youth survey. Over the course of the research, 8,000 young Hungarians between the ages of 15 and 29 were interviewed; the questionnaire also included questions about moving abroad. The Hungarian large sample youth survey was launched in 2000 and was repeated every four years thereafter. The target group of the survey was young people living in Hungary. Given the target group, the research lacks input from Hungarian young people who have left the country for a shorter or longer period time, meaning that the underlying reasons for migrating abroad cannot be examined using this dataset.

1. Introduction

In the first part of the study, we briefly review the theoretical and methodological dilemmas that challenge researchers investigating the extent of migration and its characterization; then we take a domestic look at Hungary to review the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on youth migration. The decision to migrate is always the result of a complex process, influenced by exogenous factors in addition to the individual's personal situation. The future appears increasingly unpredictable to young people, and as a result, we can assume that young people's expectations regarding the future may become more and more important for their migration plans. In the 2020 wave of the Hungarian large sample youth survey, respondents were asked how concerned they are of certain events happening; based on these answers, we examined how uncertainty and fears about the future affect the migration potential of young people in Hungary in the final section of this study.

To understand and interpret the international mobility of young people, it is also necessary to explore driving forces behind migration plans, as various motivations result in different social impacts. For example, young people may go abroad to gain experience or because they see it as an escape route. According to the data of the Hungarian large sample youth survey, Hungarian youth do not see emigration as a pressing problem; in their opinion, the issue ranks last on the ranking of the most important problems related to their generation. They often go abroad in order to gain experience, to lay a solid foundation for a secure financial future, or to broaden their horizons, and therefore expect a positive impact from their decision to migrate. At the same time, in the country of origin the issue of youth emigration receives particular attention from social, demographic, and economic points of view, as it can have a decisive, even negative impact on these processes. In

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connection with the emigration of youth, we can observe a conflict of individual and social interests, although both sides can benefit from return migration.

Migratory processes include at least two components, which can be analysed most generally by comparing the number of immigrant foreign citizens and emigrant domestic citizens based on national and international statistics (Gazsó, 2020:358). According to Mishra (1981:227-228), migration can be defined as an inflow or outflow of population from a defined region to another region for permanent or semi-permanent settlement. In this paper, we focus on emigration within this two-way process. Due to the intensification of the emigration process since the early 2010s, the main questions have focused not only on the insufficiency of the statistical system related to migration, but also on the number of migrants, their socio-demographic background and the drivers of emigration (cf. Blaskó, 2012; Gödri, 2013; Hárs, 2012, 2013; Gödri et al., 2014; Gödri, 2015; Hárs, 2016, Kapitány & Rohr, 2014; Blaskó & Gödri, 2014; Hárs & Simon, 2016). At the same time, due to the intensification of the wave of refugee migration[3] in the mid-2010s, the topic of immigration has experienced a renaissance again (cf. Bernát et al., 2015; Sik et al., 2016; Sik & Szeitl, 2016.; Barna & Koltai, 2018; Bernát et al., 2019). However, it is important to underline that it has become increasingly relevant to examine other forms of migration, such as return migration or circulation, which can no longer be considered atypical. Research on this topic has been published in recent years (cf. Hegedűs et al., 2017; Siskáné & Halász, 2018; Kajdi et al., 2019; Gábriel & Horváth, 2020), although there remains a lack of empirical data, especially large sample, representative surveys.

2. Theoretical and methodological challenges in migration research

Conceptual distinctions

Although migration is as old as humanity (Szalayné, 2009), different social processes lie behind this phenomenon in various historical periods and these transformations also have different social, economic and political consequences. In addition, spatial movements of people may be subject to different social perceptions depending on age and geographical location. Simultaneously with the appearance of migration in modern times, international literature on this phenomenon was born. The intensification of emigration to America from the second half of the 19th century aroused the interest of European decision-makers and researchers, leading to the emergence of parallel and often competing research approaches (Szabó, 2006:65). Migration research in Western Europe was launched in the 1990s, marked by the end of the bipolar world order, and was stimulated by concerns about East-West migration. Besides regime changes in Central and Eastern European countries, cross-border mobility was also catalysed by the expansion of the European Union and the free movement of labour, and migratory processes were further strengthened by economic and income differences between countries (Gödri, 2016; Ruff, 2022). The migration decision is always the consequence of a complex process, influenced not only by the individual life situation but also

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[3] As Ruff (2022) states, research on migration in Hungary from the late 1980s until the full opening of the EU labour market in 2011 focused primarily on immigration.

by exogenous factors. The intensity of the subsequent waves of emigration were shaped not only by the expansion of the European Labour Market[4] but also by factors such as the global economic crisis.

Migration is fundamentally an individual act, which develops into a social phenomenon due to its volume and extent (Hautzinger et al., 2014:18). The development of literature on migration is reflected in international scientific discourse, and it is typical that many theories compete with each other. Since there is no integrated, comprehensive theory of migration that can be used to easily understand this social phenomenon, a multidisciplinary approach is needed to analyse migration flows (Masey et al., 2012). Although opinions are also divided on which types of human movement can be included in the concept of migration, interpretations focus on human behaviour[5] , i.e. change of residence (Hautzinger et al., 2014: 5).

The main theoretical discourses on the concepts highlight different characteristics of migration. Migrants are not a homogeneous group, and there are a vast number of attempts at sociologically characterising migration flows (cf. Lőrincz et al., 2012.; L. Rédei, 2001; Bába, 2008; Halász, 2011; Szalkai, 2010; Sik, 1992; Tóth, 2001; Illés et al., 2009). Migration can be approached in several ways, and although in practice we can rarely talk about sharply distinct types, the main aspects of various migration classifications usually include spatial aspects (state border), purpose of arrival, legality and intended duration of stay. The term 'migration' has various shades of meaning (Trewartha 1969: 136.) Based on this, we can talk about internal or international migration, immigration or emigration, its voluntary or involuntary nature, permanent or semi-permanent change of residence, economic, political, cultural or ecological migration, as well as legal or illegal migration (Hautzinger et al., 2014).

Another difficult question relates to who should officially be considered a migrant? Or, in a more restricted sense, who can be considered a young migrant? The answer to this question also determines the results of the examination of migration to a substantial extent. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office investigated the effects of young people's international migration[6] between 2017 and 2019 and devoted a separate chapter to clarifying various terms in its research report, since both the concepts of 'young' and 'migrant' can be contradictory (Fassmann et al., 2018:11-16).

In the case of international migration, spatial movements of people generally refer to the longer-term relocation of individuals' main place of usual residence, i.e., the two defining features of international migration are spatial distance (length of distance) and intended duration of time (length of time). Most scholarly definitions of international migration include these two variables, but they differ significantly in their specific use. As for the spatial distance approach, international migration involves the crossing of political boundaries (for instance country line, state line, international border) (Week, 1989:186-214; Fassmann et al., 2018:11.). However, how long a person must live in another country in order to be considered an emigrant varies from country to country. Short-term and long-term migration have very different consequences, so as a first step, these

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[4] Citizens of new member states, including Hungary, were allowed access to EU labour markets. For example, Germany and Austria opened their markets in 2011. These two countries rank high in the destination ranking of emigrants.

[5] It is an undecided question what kinds of spatial mobility may be regarded as migration, whether migration should include short-term migration or emigration of longer but limited duration and with well-defined purposes (recreation, holiday, tourism, visits to friends or relatives, education, business, medical treatment, religious pilgrimage, diplomacy, missions, or even law enforcement or peacekeeping, etc.).

[6] YOUMIG - Improving institutional capacities and fostering cooperation to tackle the impacts of transnational youth migration.

two types of migration may be distinguished. The 1998 United Nations (UN) Recommendation on Statistics of International Migration states that a long-term international migrant is "a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months)".[7] As short-term international movements of people for purposes other than tourism are an important characteristic of international population mobility, the UN also recognized the importance of collecting information on persons who move to a country other than their usual country of residence for under a year (Fassmann et al., 2018:11-16). For this reason, a category of short-term international migrants has also been introduced, which includes "a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage".[8]

Based on the nature and degree of permanence of the movements, we can talk about short-term, temporary migration and temporary but fixed-term stay. Furthermore, we can distinguish between permanent, settlement (with indefinite stay) and returning home after a prolonged absence (Tóth, 2001:83). In addition, a distinction can be made between completed, permanent, or indefinite migrations and incomplete, i.e., temporary or fixed-term migrations (Hautzinger et al., 2014:14-15). Questions related to migration are also evolving with the development of the volume and structure of migration, as well as through changes in the external political, social, and economic context. In recent decades, globalization, economic crises, epidemics and wars have been constantly shaping the intensity of migration. Thanks to this, in addition to settlement, circulation is also becoming an increasingly important form of spatial movements of people. Circulation refers to a repetition of legal migration by the same person between two or more countries. It includes seasonal migration related to agricultural, construction or mass tourism and commuter migration (resulting from cross-border labour movements), as well as leisure, vocational or shopping tourism (Illés & Kincses, 2009:731–732).

Methodological background of the analysis

There is no consensus in the literature regarding the conceptual definition and theoretical approaches of migration, and as a result, the development of the sampling frame faces methodological difficulties (Várhalmi & Kováts, 2014:9-10). In addition to the diversity of conceptual and theoretical approaches to migration, the focus of the interpretations is on specific human behaviour, i.e., migration (change of residence) (Hautzinger et al., 2014:18). Migration can be examined from different aspects. For example, our examination can relate to the present (current residence abroad), the past (foreign experience, migration trends) and the future (migration potential, migration plans). For different approaches, various statistical sources, databases, and research results can be used.

[7] United Nations (1998): Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration. Revision 1, Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 58. pp.10.
[8] Ibid.

In identifying and analysing the emigration process, we can rely on administrative records and empirical research. However, methodological difficulties can be identified in both cases. In the case of administrative records, data may come from domestic registers and foreign mirror statistics (e.g., Eurostat, Destatis, Statistik Austria, etc.). Another difficulty in measuring emigration is that emigrants are not adequately represented in official statistics, since the databases only account for emigrants who have reported their departure to the authorities. Therefore, registers covering the target population are fundamentally lacking (Várhalmi & Kováts, 2014; Ruff, 2013:152-153). The estimation of emigration is mainly based on statistics from administrative data sources such as health insurance registers, tax registers, population registers, registers of foreigners, registers of residence or work permits, empirical research and labour force surveys, e.g. the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) (KSH: Migration of Hungarians according to statistics).[9] Another complicating circumstance is that population surveys in the countries of origin do not reach those persons who have moved abroad together with their entire household.

In our paper, we examine the emigration intention of the young people in Hungary using the last dataset of the Hungarian youth sociology research project, the Hungarian large sample youth survey. Over the course of the research, 8,000 young Hungarians between the ages of 15 and 29 were interviewed between 2000 and 2020; the questionnaire also included questions about moving abroad. The Hungarian large sample youth survey was launched in 2000 and was repeated every four years thereafter. The target group of the survey was young people living in Hungary.

Based on the results of the large-scale youth research, we can examine the mobility willingness of young people in Hungary, the drivers of migration, i.e., the intentions and motives of relocating young people using the explanatory power of the push-and-pull neoclassical migration model, described by one of its leading proponents, the Anglo-German geographer and soldier Ernest George Ravenstein. The theory is based on the idea of push and pull factors driving a potential migrant to consider leaving their country of residence and moving abroad. Push factors are circumstances that make it unattractive for a person to live in a certain country, while potential migrants are encouraged to emigrate by pull factors in the country of destination that they consider attractive. The theoretical basis of the model states that the volume and direction of migration are fundamentally determined by these components (Hautzinger et al., 2014:24-25; cf. Grigg, 1977). Migration decisions are influenced by several factors: micro-level decisions taken after balancing the benefits and costs of migration, which are also determined by individual goals, life situations and circumstances and the macro-structural environment. Furthermore, potential factors that are relevant for decision-making include the differences between the country of origin and the potential destination country, for instance labour market differences; demographic, social, political structural differences; cultural, linguistic, or geographical factors; the nature of historically determined interstate relationships; or the host country's migration regulations (Gödri, 2016; Ruff, 2022).

International migration is a complex, contextual and multidimensional process, several aspects of which have already been analysed in Hungarian migration research, but there are questions that neither micro-level nor macro-level approaches can adequately answer. For example, how can we

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[9] https://www.ksh.hu/sajtoszoba_kozlemenyek_tajekoztatok_2017_03_02

explain the fact that, despite similar economic, social, cultural and political circumstances and similar socio-demographic backgrounds, some people decide to emigrate, while others prefer to stay at home? These cases of migration can be analysed based on the migrant network theory. Migrant social capital differentially influences the migration decision depending on its level, diversity, and accessibility (Kiss-Kozma, 2022).

3. Hungarian citizens' international migration

Methodological difficulties make it necessary to proceed with caution when analysing statistical data on emigration, or when estimating the exact size of emigration for example. However, the trend emerging from the data of Hungarian administrative registers (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, STADAT tables) shows that from 2010 the number of Hungarian citizens spending at least one year abroad increased exponentially until 2015 (from 7,000 young people in 2010 to 33,000 in 2015), which is due to the opening of the labour market in Western European countries on the one hand, and the effects of the global economic crisis on the other. However, in 2016, the growing trend of emigration, observed from the beginning of the decade, was reversed and since then, more Hungarian citizens have been immigrating to Hungary than emigrating. Between 2019 and 2021, more Hungarian citizens moved home than emigrated. Data for 2021 and 2022 are less in line with the previous trend, as the number of Hungarian citizens emigrating has increased again (Figure 1 and Figure 2).

Figure 1. Number of immigrating and emigrating Hungarian citizens, 2010-2022

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/en/nep0030.html

In 2022, 45 percent of emigrating Hungarians chose Austria, 25 percent Germany, and 4 percent the United Kingdom as their destination country (Figure 3). While the proportion of emigrants to Austria increased compared to previous years, the proportion of emigrants to the UK and Germany decreased. 41 percent of returnees moved back from Austria, 27 percent from Germany and 12 percent from the UK in the same year (Figure 4). While the proportion of returnees from the UK and Germany decreased, the proportion of returnees from Austria increased significantly. International mobility is more pronounced among the younger age group: two-thirds of emigrating Hungarians are under the age of 40 and four tenths are under the age of 30. More than half of return migrants are under the age of 40, while more than a quarter are under the age of 30 (KSH: Magyarország, 2022).

## Figure 2. Number of returning and emigrating Hungarian citizens, 2010-2022

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/en/nep0030.html

An analysis of the number of young Hungarians aged 15-29 living in European countries shows that Germany and Austria have the highest numbers of young Hungarians (Figure 5).[10] Their numbers have been gradually increasing over the last ten years, with a higher growth rate in Germany, but in contrast to Austria, the number of young Hungarians living in Germany has been falling since 2018. A similar slow increase as in Austria can be observed in the Netherlands, where there are fewer young people of Hungarian nationality than in the previous two countries. Looking at the other European countries, Switzerland has almost the same number of young Hungarians as the Netherlands, and Denmark has become slightly more attractive in recent years.

[10] Eurostat includes those who have lived continuously in the country for at least 12 months before the reference period or who arrived in the country during the 12 months before the reference period with the intention of staying for at least one year. Data for the 15-29-year-old age group living in the UK are not available from Eurostat.

Figure 3. Distribution of emigrating Hungarian citizens by country of destination, 2022

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/en/nep0031.html

Figure 4. Distribution of returning Hungarian-born Hungarian citizens by previous country of residence, 2022

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/en/nep0032.html

Figure 5. Number of Hungarian citizens aged 15-29 living in various countries

Source: Eurostat (online data code: MIGR_POP1CTZ)

4. Results of the Hungarian large-sample youth survey

Motivations and barriers of international migration for young Hungarian people

There are many factors that can drive mobility abroad, and it is important to understand these to get a clear picture of the reasons why young people leave the country for longer or shorter periods.

The analysis of incentives and disincentives first appeared in the Youth 2008 survey. In 2008, most people would have gone abroad to work to earn some money to save (18 percent), to gain experience (4 percent), to learn a language (3 percent) or because they could have a better quality of life abroad (3 percent).

In the next three data collections, most of the questions relating to motivations were asked in the same way, so they can be compared.[11] As in the previous two surveys, in 2020 the main reason given by young people for migrating was to earn a better living. Compared to the data from the

[11] For three answer options, we can only present data from 2016 and/or 2020.

previous two surveys, there is a marked difference in this respect. Previously, two-thirds of young Hungarians said they would leave the country to improve their standard of living, but this proportion has now decreased to 44 percent. The proportion of young people who would go abroad to learn a language or to gain experience has also decreased, with a big change in these two areas compared to the previous survey in 2016. In 2020, career development was the fourth reason for mobility abroad, which is almost identical to the findings of research conducted eight years ago (Figure 6).

The proportion of emigrants seeking new challenges and looking to overcome poor financial conditions at home has decreased significantly compared to four years ago, and fewer would leave for another country because of the lack of prospects and opportunities at home. The proportion of those who would leave the country for learning purposes only – for example because there is no training in Hungary they are interested in or because they think there are more learning opportunities abroad – was lowest in 2020 of the last three surveys. One-tenth of young people would leave the country because of the political situation and 6 percent are interested in volunteering abroad.

Compared to previous years, moving to another country due to reasons related to family are up as the proportion of young people has increased in this category. This change may also be explained by the fact that 16 percent of young people already have family members, friends or acquaintances abroad.

Figure 6. Motivations for mobility abroad
(N2012 =8000, N2016 =1995, N2020 =2000)

Overall, the order of motivations for mobility has changed, with the latest results showing that young people aged 15-29 would leave the country primarily to gain better livelihoods, secondly for family-related reasons, and thirdly for career-related reasons. Learning a language and gaining experience were ranked lower, although they were ranked second and third in the two previous surveys.

In addition to the factors that encourage mobility, it is also important to look at the reasons why today's young Hungarians choose not to leave the country for longer or shorter periods.

In 2008, young people did not plan to go abroad to work mainly because they did not want to be separated from their family members, secondly because there were jobs in Hungary, and thirdly because they did not know the language.

Since 2012, the main reason given by young people in each survey has been attachment to family, but the other reasons have changed compared to the previous two surveys. Whereas previously, attachment to their homeland and friends played a very strong role in preventing young people from going abroad, in 2020 these aspects have been pushed to the back of the queue, replaced by factors related to satisfaction with what they have at home (i.e. they can manage at home, they don't want to give up their life and career here) and fear (fear of foreign surroundings, fear of failure, afraid to go it alone). The biggest decline is in attachment to family, home and friends, but lack of funds, not knowing how to get started or excessive administrative procedures have also become less important barriers (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Barriers to outward mobility[12]
(N2012 =8000, N2016 =1843, N2020 =1877)

In addition to the above reasons, the 2020 Hungarian large sample youth survey also gave young people the opportunity to give their reasons for not going abroad in a free-response format. The main reasons given were that they were still in school, wanted to finish their studies in Hungary, wanted to get a profession or a degree and might consider working abroad afterwards.

For young people, going abroad is often seen as an option many just play around with, and although it is talked about a lot, it may not be followed up by concrete action. It is therefore

[12] In 2012, the question was asked on a five-point scale, and for the 2012 data, the aggregate percentage of responses to "4" and "5" are shown ("5" means completely withhold). For the 2016 and 2020 data, the percentage of mentions is shown.

Figure 8. Strength of intention to move abroad
(N2016 =533, N2020 =518)

Legend: ■ 2016 ■ 2020

Category	
he/she is only considering the possibility	
he/she is seriously considering the idea	
he/she has already made a decision	
he/she has already taken steps to move	

Axis: 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

interesting to examine at what stage in young people's minds their plans to move abroad surface. Young people were asked about this in 2016 and 2020 and we can see that there has not been much change in this regard. Nearly 70 percent of young people aged 15-29 in Hungary are only pondering the possibility, while around one-fifth are already seriously considering moving abroad. 7 percent of young people have already made the decision to move out of Hungary and 3 percent

Figure 9. Emigration destination countries
(N2020 =463)

Countries (top to bottom): Denmark, Norway, France, Angola, Australia, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Ireland, European Union, Italy, Switzerland, United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Germany

Axis: 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

have already taken concrete steps to do so (Figure 8).

The Hungarian Youth 2020 survey asked young people which country they would go to. The main destinations confirmed by other mobility surveys are those where young people in Hungary would also go, with nearly 30 percent going to Germany, nearly one-fifth to Austria and around one-tenth of young Hungarians indicating the United Kingdom as their destination. Around 4 percent would go overseas, and 1-3 percent largely to other EU or non-EU countries (Figure 9).

Figure 10. Young people's concerns regarding the future (To what extent are you concerned about...?)
(n=2,000)

| Concern	Value
robots taking away human jobs?	40
artificial intelligence?	40
another world war?	44
immigration into the European Union?	50
climate change?	56
another global economic crisis?	56
politicians governing the country badly?	57
a pandemic?	59

Source: 2020 Hungarian large sample youth survey

Uncertainty and migration

In today's rapidly changing world, we may often feel a sense of uncertainty – we're left scratching our heads upon hearing certain news stories or observing new processes being implemented in our surroundings. Given the new natural and social phenomena, many people ask themselves and experts what they can expect from the coming decades. How we plan our lives in the short and long term poses a significant challenge right now for many.

During the 2020 data collection of the Hungarian large sample youth survey (Pillók et al., 2021), young people were asked to what extent they fear climate change, migration pressure, economic crises, and other processes that pose challenges for the future. As shown in Figure 10, young people

aged 15-29 living in Hungary are most afraid of a pandemic[13] as well as of politicians governing the country badly. In addition to these, young people are afraid of two other potential future problems: a global economic crisis and climate change. Migration into Europe is an issue young people are most divided on; this is supported by the 50 points achieved on the 100-point scale.[14] The majority

Table 1: Clusters' median values and the sample means of each variable
To what extent are you concerned about...? (n=1941)

	THE BRAVE	THE PESSIMISTS	THE REALISTS	ENTIRE SAMPLE (AVERAGE)
A GLOBAL PANDEMIC?	1.84	4.15	3.38	**3.37**
POLITICIANS RUNNING THE COUNTRY POORLY?	1.81	3.99	3.33	**3.27**
ANOTHER GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS?	1.60	4.07	3.31	**3.26**
CLIMATE CHANGE?	1.66	4.03	3.30	**3.25**
MIGRATION INTO EUROPE?	1.48	3.80	3.01	**3.00**
ANOTHER WORLD WAR?	1.33	3.85	2.53	**2.76**
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE?	1.35	3.56	2.40	**2.60**
ROBOTS TAKING AWAY HUMAN JOBS?	1.37	3.63	2.34	**2.60**
PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL SAMPLE	**18%**	**34%**	**48%**	

Source: Hungarian youth survey 2020

of respondents do not fear the outbreak of a third world war, nor are they afraid of artificial intelligence, or that robots will replace people's jobs eventually. Based on the question, we formed three groups using K-means cluster analysis to see the differences between the groups of young people. The first group includes those who are not afraid of the listed phenomena – we named them the "Brave" group. In the second cluster we find those who are at the other end of the spectrum (the "Pessimists"); not only do they fear everything, but they also believe in the possibility of all

[13] Data collection for the Hungarian Youth Survey 2020 was carried out in autumn 2020, during the second wave of the coronavirus pandemic.

[14] The question was originally measured on a five-point Likert scale, and the answers were converted to a 100-point scale to make the differences more visible. On the 100-point scale, values above 50 indicate agreement and scores below 50 indicate disagreement.

eight crises happening. The third cluster is composed of those who slightly deviate from the main average. They fear climate change, migration, an economic crisis, a pandemic, and the mistakes of politicians, but most of them are not afraid of the outbreak of a world war, and compared to the average, they are less afraid of robots and artificial intelligence. We named the members of this latter cluster the "Realists". They make up almost half of the sample while pessimists make up a third of the sample, and the brave make up nearly a fifth (Table 1).

To further characterise these cluster groups, we provided details as seen below:

The Brave

This cluster is mainly composed of men (54 percent) and the relative majority (38 percent) are 25-29 years old. Regarding education levels, this group has the largest proportion (29 percent) of individuals with only a grade school education and with vocational training (21 percent). In terms of marital status, people living in a cohabiting relationship are overrepresented, but the absolute majority – as in the other clusters – are single or unmarried. Compared to the average, young people living in the Northern Great Plain and Central Hungary regions, as well as residents of cities make up an outstanding proportion. When it comes to mobility – i.e. whether they plan to go abroad to study or work – this group has the smallest proportion of mobile people (22 percent). The absolute majority of them have (65 percent) trust in the future.

The Pessimists

This group is made up of 50 percent women and contains more than the average members from the 20-24 age group, skilled workers, and high school graduates. Out of the three clusters, the highest proportion of singles (77 percent) and the least amount of married people (10 percent) are present here. According to geographical location, compared to the average, there are more young people from the Northern Great Plain, Central Hungary and Central Transdanubia in this cluster, and when considering the type of settlement, there are relatively more people living in villages. Those belonging to this group have the largest proportion of foreign plans, 29 percent of them plan to leave the country.

The Realists

In terms of gender distribution, men are in the absolute majority (53 percent) in this cluster. The age distribution corresponds to the average. When considering education, graduates or those with higher education are overrepresented here. Among the three groups, the proportion of married people is the highest (12 percent). Young people from the Southern Great Plain and Western Transdanubia, as well as those living in the capital or cities with county status can be found at above-average rates. 27 percent intend to gain experience in another country.

When examining which type of cluster is typical for mobile and nonmobile young people, it can be seen that in both groups there is a relative majority of realists (48-48 percent), but pessimists

Figure 11. Trust in the future based on mobility intentions (Overall, do you look forward to the future or do you fear it?)
(n=2000)

Source: 2020 Hungarian large sample youth survey

are overrepresented among those with mobility plans (37 percent) and compared to the average, there are fewer brave people (15 percent).

Another question provides an opportunity to examine young people's confidence in the future as a whole. Based on that, it can be concluded that 44 percent of 15-29-year-olds in Hungary strongly or to some extent have confidence in the future, 42 percent moderately, and 14 percent strongly or to some extent fear the future. Analysing the question on the basis of mobility intention, we can observe a significant connection[15] between mobility goals and expectations about the future. More than half of the young people who want to study or work abroad have confidence in the future, while this is 10 percent lower among the non-mobile young people. Among those who do not want to move to another country, there are more than average people who simultaneously intend to stay and trust in the years ahead of them (Figure 11).

An important and attention-grabbing piece of information is what young people consider to be the most pressing problem of youth. We wondered if there was a difference between the two groups in this regard. A significant difference can be observed[16]: compared to the average, more mobile young people think that the biggest problem is uncertainty and an unpredictable future (26 percent), as well as unemployment and difficulties in finding a job (7 percent).

[15] Cramer's V=0.104; p ≤ 0.000
[16] Cramer's V=0.108; p ≤ 0.000

5. Conclusion

The phenomenon of migration has existed since the dawn of humanity. As such, the willingness to be mobile is part of human nature, albeit with significant differences between mobility potentials. Today's accelerated, globalised world economy rewards mobility in a certain sense: employees who speak multiple languages, have foreign experience, learn about other cultures, are innovative and flexible, and willing to go anywhere in the world to acquire the know-how necessary to increase economic competitiveness can gain a serious advantage in the labour market. However, there are other, more drastic reasons for migration, such as when people threatened by war or natural disasters are forced to leave their homes en masse. Measuring migration is difficult in many ways since it necessitates defining an ongoing human behavior and movement. The dilemmas of definition and measurement are further complicated by the fact that different types of migration are becoming dominant in our changing world: while previously the attention of researchers was mainly tied to economic migration, from the mid-1990s the focus shifted towards refugees of other cultures, and today the effect of epidemics and wars in the geographic proximity becomes the most important factor of investigation. The decision to migrate is the end result of a complex process, which is greatly influenced by external events in addition to the individual life situation. The past year and a half contained many defining, paradigm-changing events, all of which significantly influenced the lives of societies. And unfortunately, this story is not over yet. During the coronavirus epidemic, the measures introduced by national governments primarily limited mobility, but the war raging in our neighborhood also has a significant impact on everyday life. As a result, young people's future plans and fears about the future may become more and more pivotal in terms of their decision to migrate, as it not only influences the decision, but also has other social consequences if a young person travels abroad to gain experience or sees an escape route.

The research seems to confirm the hypothesis that young people are the social group most affected by the issue of emigration. In their case, it is important to consider, on the one hand, how the world-historical events taking place around them affect their future plans, and on the other hand, how much their perceptions of the future influence the migration potential. The majority of young Hungarians are aware that the future holds many challenges for them, that they will have to deal with serious problems, and that they will have to do a lot to solve them. They mainly fear epidemics, the poor governance of politicians, economic crises, and climate change. They are most divided on the challenges of migration from other continents into Europe and are least afraid of the processes generated by the fourth industrial revolution.

Based on the 2020 data of the Hungarian large sample youth survey, three groups can be distinguished among young people aged 15–29 living in Hungary in relation to the above attitudes. One group is essentially not afraid of any negative impacts, the other group, on the contrary, predicts and fears the occurrence of all of them, and the third group is mainly afraid of political, economic and natural crises.

More than half of those planning to study or work abroad have a sense of confidence in the future, and a higher-than-average proportion of them believe that the biggest problem for young people is uncertainty and an unpredictable future, as well as unemployment and difficulties in finding a job.

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Prejudice Among Young People in Hungary: A Possible Explanation

István Murányi[1]

Research shows that strong prejudices towards minority groups are characteristic to young people living in disadvantageous socio-cultural life environments. In previous analyses, we tried to explain prejudice using the concept introduced by Fuchs and Case. According to Fuchs and Case, "… prejudice is not an attitude, but a way of life", i.e. embedded in the entire life situation. The variety of group memberships and differences between group norms encourage group members to choose alternative interpretations or participate in interactions according to various "rites". In our analysis, we primarily seek to answer whether the conception is valid with view to the representative, large (N=8,000) nationwide sample of Hungarian Youth 2020 research, also known as the Hungarian large-sample youth survey. Based on the analyses, we proved that prejudices are explained by Fuchs and Case's theory of intergroup prejudice.

1. Introduction

An important conclusion of the analysis examining prejudice among teenagers in the period following the transition to democracy (and summarizing the most significant youth sociology research) was that prejudice against various minority groups is typical of young people who live in a socio-cultural environment that is at a disadvantage from the point of view of socialization (Murányi, 2006). Intolerance towards minorities is most common among the children of uneducated and elderly parents living in small towns in the north-eastern region of Hungary, living in poor financial conditions, mostly studying in vocational schools. This result resonated with the experience of a previous Hungarian research suggesting that young people studying in lower-prestige education institutions are more dismissive of members of minority groups (Szabó & Örkény,1998). How can it be explained that prejudice is primarily characteristic of young people whose immediate family and wider residential environment, as well as their cultural situation, can be called disadvantageous?

The answer is complex, but the results of various empirical studies consistently suggest that compared to groups that differ from the majority and are considered different (in terms of nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, as well as the disabled and substance abusers), young people are "traditionally withdrawn". In the period after the system change, the results of a relatively large number of surveys based on the same methodology confirm that Hungarian society is characterized by coherent and continuous anti-foreigner sentiment, which differs only slightly in different social groups (Kende et al., 2018).

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According to the research results, Hungarian society's social representation of minorities reflects a coherent rejection, but this coherence is varied: different groups in society are characterized by different representations, but the presented research results and other studies also prove that the rejection of minorities is differentiated. How can the different patterns of rejection and social representation be explained?

The interpretation of prejudice as a lifeform (Fuchs & Case, 1992) offers a comprehensive explanation that fits the two types of the most accepted normative theories, which classify the formation and interpretation primarily according to the socialization environment or rather to contact with minority groups. The common characteristics of the two types (contact with minority groups, personal and object-communication environment) also strengthen the lifeform interpretation. We do not have the opportunity to discuss prejudice in detail, so we only refer to a relevant grouping. Based on their separation according to theoretical and empirical aspects, prejudice theories can be classified into two types: evaluative (normative) and descriptive theories (Erős, 2007). The peculiarity of the first type can be highlighted, according to which "Prejudices do not arise from human nature itself, but from a person's inherent, internal psychic abilities… external influences shape the emotional-motivational and cognitive-thinking foundations of prejudice within the personality as well" (Erős, 2007:3). Meanwhile, according to theories belonging to the second type, "…prejudice is not a value-laden expression… Prejudgment follows from the specifics of the functioning of the human psyche…" (Erős, 2007:4).

In the definition of prejudice[2] between groups, the interpretation that can be classified into the first group is authoritative, which defines prejudice as a judgement that is characteristically supported or opposed by an individual or group formed during group relations (attitude, prejudiced thinking, discriminatory behaviour, prejudiced attitude, intolerance, exclusionary attitude) cover different, organically connected aspects of the same phenomenon.

We seek to answer the question of prejudice formation with the help of a comprehensive explanation (Fuchs & Case, 1989), which interprets prejudice with the concepts of lifeform and ritual density based on interactionist and developmental theories. We deal with the interpretation of the term in detail below. For now, we only point out that the aforementioned summarized analysis, based on other empirical research (Angelusz & Tardos, 1988; Gábor, 2000; Bauer, 2002), proved that in the culturally and existentially disadvantaged family and residential environments, several characteristics of a high ritual density lifeform can be found (Murányi, 2006). Such characteristics include interactions taking place in closed groups, use of limited language codes, acceptance of traditional moral principles, and knowledge of socio-cultural models different from one's own group. However, the correspondence between prejudice, way of life, and the socio-cultural environment does not yet "directly" support the theory that interprets prejudice as a lifeform.[3]

In the following, based on the theory of Fuchs and Case, we attempt to establish the relationship between prejudice and the way of life characterized on the basis of ritual density.

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[2] "Prejudice can be defined as a judgment characteristically supported or opposed by a group or individual, consistent in its tendency." (Tajfel, 1981:131.)

[3] In previous research, we examined the relationship between prejudices and national concepts in different national contexts among university students (Murányi et al., 2010) We sought to justify that the explanation based on the view of prejudices by Fuchs and Case – according to whom prejudice is not an attitude but a way of life – is valid in different national contexts. For this reason, the procedure was applied in our survey in order to validate the conception in three (Hungarian, Finnish, Russian) different cultural-political contexts on the one hand and to use it as a reference model in determining the explanation of prejudice on the other hand.

2. Method

In this study, we analyze the database of the Hungarian large-sample youth survey. The research was conducted on a large (N=8,000) representative sample of Hungarian youth aged 15-29 (Hungarian Youth 2020) and is suitable for testing the theory – undoubtedly revealing sociocultural differences resulting from sampling and age characteristics. [4]

In the first part of this article, we briefly introduce some main characteristics pertaining to prejudice, then we outline the method and the indicators of the survey. The second part contains the data analysis. Next, we will try to interpret this relationship from a socialization point of view. However, before our analysis, we briefly summarize the thought process of Fuchs and Case's study.

3. "Ritual density"

The authors' concept for interpreting prejudice, ritual density, is based on the open and closed nature of the group frames of interactions. How "ritual" the experience of the interactions is, i.e. how homogenous, depends on the openness and closedness of the group framework. Linguistic codes can also be seen as the manifestation of ritual density. Collins classifies group networks into high- and low-density types based on their "ritual structure" (Collins, 1975).

Fuchs and Case believe that this approach is in line with Habermas's interpretation, which sees prejudice as the appearance of systematically distorted communication, which "…occurs when the actors of symbolic interaction have an unequal chance to express their opinion, to criticize the other's opinion, the validity inherent in speech acts to raise or question demands, as well as to display their self-identity…" (Fuchs & Case, 1992:503).

Fuchs and Case criticize theories suitable for the evolutionary approach to prejudice (Parsons, Habermas, Kohlberg) which assume that developmental stages are unidirectional, universal, and irreversible. Fuchs says that postconventional, egalitarian and unprejudiced morality is not independent of context: "So the structures of moral consciousness do not follow some kind of developmental logic but change with the density conditions of the life worlds. (…) In modern societies, situations of low and high ritual density coexist" (Fuchs & Case, 1992:508).

The majority of interactions in closed group settings follow the same patterns. High ritual density is the result of constant interactions within unchanged group frameworks, characterized by homogeneous shared experiences and limited linguistic codes, and which "lead to one-dimensional identification with particular group aspects," "force one-dimensional fixations on one's own group, and therefore reduce foundations of cosmopolitanism and universality" (Fuchs & Case, 1992:502). In contrast, low ritual density is characterized by extensive social networks and multifaceted interactions. Low density is characterized by a wide-ranging network of connections and – thanks to this – a variety of cultural experiences. When learning about and experiencing alternative ways of

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[4] "However, during the large-scale youth research, we also work with split samples (in 2004, 2008, 2016 and 2020), which means that different questionnaire scenarios were queried on several - individually representative - samples.… A clear disadvantage of this solution is that questions that were queried only on a sub-sample can be examined to a limited extent." (Székely 2021: 2060-2061)

life, it is less likely that they will be rejected because of their difference. Accepting the contingency of lifestyles (Luhman, 1984) is incompatible with prejudice. For Fuchs and Case, prejudice is – contrary to most social psychological interpretations – not an attitude, but a lifeform. Attitudes and cognitions are considered to be the consequence of social habits and everyday interactions, that is, the way of life. "The concept of ritual density encourages us to expand the concept of prejudice itself. When we hear about "prejudice," specific attitudes towards certain groups -- minorities, subcultures – come to mind. However, our discussion suggests that not only certain thoughts, but also the ways of life themselves can be prejudiced" (Fuchs & Case, 1992:510).

High ritual density is associated with a way of life that has a narrow knowledge of different socio-cultural patterns and where the interactions of group members are limited to their own group. Conventional moral principles concerning one's own group are conditioned in such a way that discriminatory attitudes towards those outside the group develop. High ritual density favours viewing the world based on simplified, absolute values; its important feature is that group solidarity forged with strong collective emotions goes hand in hand with the exclusion of outsiders:

"Prejudice, as a way of life, wants to get back to the traditional way of life, absolute values, fundamentalist religious feelings, the simply constructed world view, which in our opinion are all highly ritualistic consequences of a dense lifestyle. High ritual density creates strong collective emotions, rigid group solidarity and strict distancing from outsiders. It is this internal structure of preconceived movements that goes against the ideas of modernity." (Fuchs & Case, 1992:510)

4. Attitudes of young people towards minorities

The questions that were used in the questionnaire focused on the following topics: acceptance and rejection of members of minority groups considered deviant, media consumption, communications with family and friends, cultural and organizational activities. To explore the logic of the different forms of rejection, we performed a principal component analysis. In the first step, we created dummy variables according to whether the respondent at least accepts or does not accept the named minority as the respondent's workplace colleague. The most rejected minority is the group of homosexuals, while the rejection rate for former convicts and drug users is lower. In addition to the limitations of the questionnaire, what is the reason that we interpreted the following prejudices regarding stigmatized minorities? Some answers to the question:

In the past period, efforts to learn about stereotypes and prejudices against groups that were previously not or only minimally studied have become more and more common. In addition to ethnic-cultural or origin groups, "(…) negative feelings toward women, people with different sexual habits, physically and/or mentally stigmatized people, and those in disadvantaged economic and social situations have gained an increasing role in research." (Erős, 2007:8)

As part of an international comparative study, prejudice against homosexuals in Hungary – compared to the Visegrad countries – is higher than average. Assessment and acceptance largely depend on whether the respondent has a homosexual acquaintance (Dencső & Sík, 2007). It can be assumed that the lower rate of rejection towards drug users and those in prison is due to the fact

that belonging to the two stigmatized minorities is more acceptable, and accordingly the rejection of the environment is also less intense.

The direction of research that examines prejudices and stereotypes by learning about lifestyles, cultural contexts, and social representations or by learning about the characteristics of the wider political environment – in several cases by exploring causal relationships – is especially strengthened (Jost, 2003).

Attitudes towards deviant groups rejected by mainstream society were based on prejudice measured by the method of interpersonal distance (the Bogardus scale). The tolerant group that would accept minority groups as colleagues is 54 percent of the sample, while the proportion of the intolerant group is 44 percent.[5] Taking into account the distribution of values of the social distance scale, the criterion of the dummy variable used to express the relationship with minorities was "acceptance of the colleague". The result of the principal component analysis involving the three variables is the combined expression of the rejection of the three minorities.[6]

In the following, we present the variables necessary for the interpretation of prejudice as a lifeform.

5. Indicators of lifeforms

The questionnaire included several questions that could be suitable indicators of the previously described high and low ritual density lifestyle. To characterize the way of life, we accounted for the following topics: media consumption, religious and cultural activity, conversations with family and friends. The common characteristic of topics is that they are related to everyday interactions. Since they provide an "exit" from the narrow framework of primary (family) and secondary socialization (peer group, institutions) and they enrich communication opportunities, it is likely that they characterize a lifestyle with low ritual density. The topics were covered by a total of seven variables.

The first group of variables is related to media consumption. From the point of view of the ritual density of the way of life, we see the importance of media consumption in that it can loosen the closedness of the group frames of interactions, even if it is one-sided communication. These include listening to the radio, reading newspapers and magazines, and watching TV to learn about socio-cultural patterns different from one's own group and a world view that has little preference for absolute values.[7]

Given the role of the family as a role model and the fact that socialization is one of the most important factors, the prominent role of primary socialization justifies the fact that conversations

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[5] The distribution of answers to the question (Which closest relationship would you accept with a member of the listed social groups?): 1. homosexual: would accept as a family member (6%); would accept as a roommate (4%) would accept as a colleague (17%) - total: 28%. 2. drug user: would accept as a family member (1%); would accept as a roommate (3%) would accept as a colleague (9%) - total: 13%3. imprisoned: would accept as a family member (2%) would accept as a roommate (2%) would accept as a colleague (9%) - total: 13%. 1: accept (1-3): tolerant: 44%. 0: reject (47%): intolerant: 54%.
[6] Principal component analysis: Communalities (homosexual: 0.553; drug addict: 0.770, imprisoned: 0.788) Total Variance Explained (Sums of Squared % of Variance): 70,373; Component Matrix (homosexual: 0.744; drug addict: 0.878, imprisoned: 0.888)
[7] The questions and the combined answers: How often do you listen to the radio? (less often than weekly: 40%); How often do you watch television? (less often than weekly (12%); How often do you read newspapers? (Less than weekly: 74%) The values of the dummy variable: 1: with some frequency; 0: never.

with family and friends on various topics were also included among the lifeform variables.[8]

The consideration of the third group of variables – variables related to religious and cultural organizational activity[9] – is justified by the fact that belonging to organizations and organizational membership can also be a source of experience for different worldviews and world interpretations, contributing to the plural interpretation of the world by young people.

As a result of the quick cluster analysis performed involving the seven variables (listening to the radio, watching TV, reading newspapers, talking with family, talking with friends, religious activity, going to the bookstore), the sample of young people was divided into two groups.

Table 1. Characteristics of ritual density clusters
(average value of the variables)

	HIGH RITUAL DENSITY GROUP (N= 5530)	LOW RITUAL DENSITY GROUP N= (2570)
LISTENING TO THE RADIO	0.2616	0.7535
WATCHING TV	0.7083	0.9590
READING THE NEWSPAPER	0.0544	0.3565
TALKING WITH FAMILY	0.3607	0.9246
TALKING WITH FRIENDS	0.2662	0.8749
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY	0.2125	0.6396
GOING TO THE BOOKSTORE	0.2224	0.2629
	68%	32%

K-Means Cluster Analysis

Table 2 proves that media consumption, communication with family and friends, going to church, and visiting bookstores are all activities that expand group frames, enrich interpersonal interactions, and expand personal communication and thinking patterns about the world. In the group with high ritual density (68 percent of the sample), all variables are characterized by the lowest activity; the least deviation is characterized by watching TV and visiting the bookstore. The activity of the group with low ritual density (32 percent of the sample) is consistently higher. In the following, we examine how our results fit with our previous studies, in which we interpreted the prejudices of young people based on socio-cultural characteristics.

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[8] The questions and answer options: How often do you talk to your family about public issues and social problems? 1 – regularly: 11%; 2 – occasionally: 63%; 3 – never: 25% And how often do you talk to your friends and direct acquaintances about public issues and social 25% problems? 1 – regularly: 10%; 2 – occasionally: 59%; 3 – never: 31 %. The values of the dummy variable: 1: with some frequency; 0: never.
[9] The question and the distribution of answers: Apart from weddings, funerals, and family events, how often do you attend religious services these days? 1 – daily: 2%; 2 – several times a week: 3%; weekly: 3%; two to three times a month: 2%; monthly: 3 %: a few times a year: 14%; annually: 7%; less often than annually: 12%.; essentially never: 51%. The values of the dummy variable: 1: with some frequency:0 ; never. How often do you go to the bookstore? 1- several times a week: 0%; once a week: 1%. several times a month: 5%; Every 2-3 months: 13%; several times a year: 27%; almost never: 54%. The values of the dummy variable: 1: with some frequency; 0: never (54%)

6. Prejudice and ritual density

Now all that remains is to see if there is a correlation between prejudice and belonging to groups separated by ritual density. The theoretical idea of Fuchs and Case can be verified empirically if groups separated on the basis of ritual density are characterized by significantly different prejudice intensity.[10] The results prove that there are significant differences in the social composition of groups separated by ritual density. Based on these, we can consider it justified that a lifestyle with high ritual density is not independent of the socio-cultural environment.

The score averages of the main component showing the acceptance of minorities and the significant distributions of prejudice in the groups separated based on ritual density support our expectation: compared to the group with low ritual density, the proportion characterized by prejudice is higher in the group with high ritual density.

Table 2. Relationship between prejudice in groups separated by ritual density
(score refers to prejudice principal component score)

HIGH RITUAL DENSITY GROUP	0.1456
LOW RITUAL DENSITY GROUP	-0.0688

Oneway ANOVA, p ≤ 0.001

7. Conclusion

Hungarian and international research has repeatedly proven that a socially disadvantaged situation is associated with a greater degree of prejudice. However, little has been explained about the types of relationship networks and communication patterns that underlie this relationship.

Similarly to the majority of social science research, the empirical provability of Fuchs and Case's idea based on the concept of ritual density is determined by prejudice (interpersonal distance) and the operationalization of ritual density. In our analysis, we tried to find an empirical explanation, following the ideas of Fuchs and Case, for why socially disadvantaged young people attending lower prestigious secondary schools are more prejudiced. Fuchs and Case's concept of ritual density offered us the opportunity to operationalize the concept of ritual density empirically on the basis of our data collection among young people in 2020 -- on the one hand to test the correlation between ritual density and prejudice, and on the other hand, based on the results of our analysis, to interpret prejudice depending on ritual density ourselves.

The confirmed relationship between ritual density and prejudice fits with the findings of early social psychological studies analyzing the formation of stereotypes. These studies proved that

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[10] Proportion in the high ritual density group: 1. Type of settlement (Budapest: 54%, county seat: 65%, city :72%, village: 71%. (Significant (p ≤ 0.001) relationships based on chi-square test (value: 149.8, Cramer's V: 0.137, p ≤ 0.001) Age group (15-19 years: 58 %, 20-24 years:69%, 25-29 years: 72 %, (Significant (p ≤ 0.001) relationships based on chi-square test (value: 122.03, Cramer's V: 0.129, p ≤ 0.001); Parents' highest completed education (Father: 8 elementary or less: 64%, workman: 71%, graduation: 62% , diploma /PhD: 71%, (Significant (p ≤ 0.001) relationships based on chi-square test (value: 111.8, Cramer's V: 0.18, p ≤ 0.001) Mother (8 elementary or less: 64%, workman: 71%, graduation: 65%, diploma /PhD: 68%, (Significant (p ≤ 0.001) relationships based on chi-square test (value: 111.8, Cramer's V: 0.18, p ≤ 0.001)

adherence to social norms makes prejudice more likely (Pettigrew, 1958).

Social groups with different ritual density and socio-cultural features are characterized by a specific culture. These group cultures have different social norms. Based on the interpretation of ritual density, we can rightly assume that groups characterized by high ritual density are more closely tied to the social norms of their own culture than members of low-density groups who have the opportunity to be members of several groups. On the one hand, the latter can become familiar with alternative interpretations, and on the other hand, can form their own system of norms on the basis of "choice" by meeting the norms of several groups, getting to know them, possibly complementing and clashing with each other.

In groups characterized by different ritual density, three characteristics meet: the social and cultural status characteristic of the group, the system of norms, and the worldview expressed linguistically and in the way of communication. We believe that the differences shown in the prejudice of groups characterized by different ritual density prove that in socialization understood as a series of interactions, basic values and norms can be learned as members of different communities. These communities (family, school, peer groups, wider groups) not only integrate young people, but also provide them with the social, economic, and cultural (symbolic, communication, thinking) experiences that further group memberships and that serve as the building blocks for subsequent behaviours (Percheron, 1993; 1999; Szabó, 2000). The demarcation or openness of these communities and relationship systems, their typical behaviour, thinking patterns, reality interpretation schemes, homogeneity or diversity of worldviews, the type of language codes, and, last but not least, the range of knowledge, values and emotions required for group membership are determined by the reception of other groups -- and also the prejudice of the personal relationship towards their members.

The correlations verified in our analysis provide an answer as to why the prejudice persists. The coercive force of group norms, group conformity, is stronger in groups characterized by a high ritual density. The members of these groups are more likely to obey group norms. In their case, the number of groups that can be taken into account from the point of view of affiliations is smaller, their groups are more closed, and the possibilities of relations with other groups are limited. Group norms are reproduced as individual norms of the members who identify with the group; the legitimacy of the norms is not questioned by other group norms, since the members of the groups encounter them less often. If they do encounter the norms of other groups, they do not or only barely affect them.

Groups characterized by a way of life with high and low ritual density must have a different effect on opinions related to other groups and minorities when different opinions – agreeing or disagreeing – are perceived. In addition, prejudice is probably also a function of what kind of "others" (one's own group or external group) one agrees with in the assessment of minorities. The planned later empirical verification of our assumptions may shade the research results so far -- the prejudice of young people is mostly interpreted in the system of socialization agents, on the basis of direct intergroup contact.

In further research, the interpretation and empirical verification of prejudice based on the theory of Fuchs and Case should be connected with the results of recent research on stereotypes and racial prejudices. A smaller part of today's models for the formation and explanation of prejudices

names the socialization environment as the dominant influencing factor, and the larger part, contact with minority groups. We consider the interpretation of prejudice as a way of life to be an important explanation because it cannot be clearly assigned to one or the other trend; the characteristics of both (contact with minority groups, personal and object-communication environment) can be discovered in the theory of Fuchs and Case. In the future, therefore, further relevant explanations that can properly supplement the lifeform theory should be researched. We consider this to be the case with the experiments of Stangor and his colleagues (Stangor et al., 2003), who, in contrast to explanations emphasizing direct intergroup relations, proved that beliefs about ethnic groups are influenced by the knowledge that others identify with this attitude. The high and the low for groups characterized by a densely ritual way of life, the perception of different opinions – agreeing or disagreeing – must have a different effect on the opinions related to other groups and minorities. In addition, prejudice is probably also a function of what kind of "others" (in relation to one's own group or external group) one agrees with in the assessment of minorities. The planned empirical verification of our assumptions may shade the research results so far – the prejudice of young people is mostly interpreted in the system of socialization agents, on the basis of direct intergroup contact.

Finally, we emphasize that in the explanation of stereotypes and prejudice against others, one can and should rely on more than just one theory. Empirically verified sociological and social psychological research can be causally related to the perception of otherness in seemingly incompetent areas. We investigated the social representation of democracy among young people based on the data of an international research (Murányi, 2017).[11] The primary research goal of the study was to reveal how far-right ideologies are widespread and supported among European youth, and how negative attitudes towards various minority groups (xenophobia, exclusion, welfare chauvinism) can be characterized.

Perhaps the most important conclusion of our analysis is that the anti-liberal association type, which plays a central role (core) in the social representation of democracy, is supported by young people who are intensely interested in political and public issues and historical events and who are mainly nationalist, most of them still in high school or highly educated. Another important characteristic is that this group is characterized by a more favourable than average family background. In other words, it is certainly thought-provoking that the interpretation/perception of anti-liberal democracy is open to the world and inquisitive, living in an above-average social environment in terms of existence and cultural capital. It is also noteworthy that the supporters of the type of association that questions the existence of democracy (Fiction type) are also highly educated, more intensely interested than average in public and historical issues and live in families characterized by social advantages. Among the other two types, the interpretation of democracy that prefers community, consensus and law (Public law type) is only typical of young people who are intensely interested in politics, as well as young people who are characterized by a sense of difference and the resulting danger. The fourth association type (Lack type) can also be called a non-existent type, since the young people listed here did not accept the association with the concept of democracy.

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[11] The questionnaire research was carried out in June-July 2012 within the framework of the Myplace project on a probability sample of N=600-600 people aged 15-26 from two small Hungarian towns (Sopron and Ózd).

Who are these young people? Based on the examined aspects, how can they be characterized? In contrast to the other three groups, they are characterized by a low existential family background, a low level of education and a high proportion of ethnic minorities.

In summary: for young people, whether democracy exists or not, acceptance of otherness is not supported.

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Top ten Social Issues Among Youth

Fanni Radnai [1]

The Hungarian Youth Research Institute published its new book, *Kívánj tizet!*, which includes several papers on the self-reflection among Hungarian youth and how they see their future. The book is segmented into 10 main parts addressing the challenges youth face today.

"In your opinion, what is the most aggravating problem for youth?" asked the Youth Research Institute in its survey of young Hungarians aged 15-29. Each chapter focused on a single challenge, presenting both a Hungarian and an international perspective on the survey's results. Some chapters explored materialistic issues such as homelessness and housing problems, while others explored less tangible topics concerning the mental and social perceptions of youth, such as uncertainty and aimlessness.

(1) The most pressing challenge for youth has become uncertainty and the unpredictable future. In recent years, this particular problem steadily climbed the ranks in the top ten until it eventually claimed first place. Levente Székely outlined this topic while analyzing data from a large sample youth survey. It appears that Hungarian youth view their own future optimistically, yet they hold a more negative view toward their own generation's outlook. Uncertainty plays a significant role in our daily lives, intensified by manipulative news in the media. Regarding the uncertainty about the future, youth see solutions in strengthening family connections and improving their financial situations.

(2) Worldwide, the youth seem to be facing a challenging situation concerning poverty, particularly as they depleted much of their emergency funds and even lost their jobs during the pandemic. Tamás Isépy, Képíróné Judit Huber, and Péter Koncz examined the second most pressing problem among Hungarian youth: material hardships and poverty. Despite youth being notably sensitive to sudden environmental changes, most Hungarian young people appear to be relatively far from poverty altogether.

(3) Dávid Kollár and Péter Pillók examined the third most pressing problem, aimlessness. They constructed two models to address this issue, considering young people who were goal-oriented. Hungarian youth who responded positively to having clear aims in their lives seemed to have more structured expectations and their decision-making abilities were more creative and authentic. Conversely, when these elements were absent from their lives, they tended to feel a sense of aimlessness.

(4) Hungarian youth appears to experience increased loneliness with fewer social connections, which was intensified by the impact of the pandemic. László Grúz and Balázs Fekete delved into the fourth problem: the deterioration of social lives and communities among youth. They highlighted the numerous positive effects that social relationships can have on individuals. Considering that the younger generation spends an average of six hours a day online, (sometimes even doubling that duration) social media has the potential for both positive and negative impacts on the lives of youth, simultaneously connecting and isolating them from each other.

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(5) Petra Arnold investigated the fifth most burning issue: alcohol and drug use among young people. Her research also focused on the decline in heavy alcohol consumption post-2011. It was found that Hungarian youth are drinking less frequently but consuming larger portions compared to previous years. In contrast to other nations, young Hungarians exhibit more intense alcohol consumption while their drug use is comparatively less severe. The author of the paper concludes that more emphasis on healthy lifestyles, stricter parental control, and reduced real-life interactions significantly contribute to the decline in alcohol and drug consumption among youth.

(6) Katalin Bördős and Luca Koltai delved into the sixth most critical problem: the labor market, where the youth demographic stands as one of the most vulnerable groups. They highlighted how a young person's family or social background often limits their opportunities. Youth are at a higher risk of inactivity, unemployment, and engaging in non-traditional employment. The authors suggest that solutions might involve raising wages or organizing job training programs that are inclusive (even for disadvantaged young individuals).

(7) Andrea Rosta researched the seventh most critical problem: crime, which can originate from various causes — be it personal, social, or economic factors. Since 2010, young Hungarians have been involved in fewer criminal activities, with theft being the most common encounter with the law. The author suggests that while the primary focus should be on educating young individuals for positive behavior, the justice system lacks the necessary tools for this task. There is a need for new tools, institutions, alternative approaches, professionals, and training within the justice system to address these challenges effectively.

(8) Balázs János Kocsis researched the eighth most critical problem: housing problems. In recent years, Hungarian youth in the housing market have shown limited housing mobility, and the prices of apartments / houses tends to be high, especially in Budapest and larger cities. "Those in the age range of having children tend to have homes that are, on average, small and have fewer rooms," and among these individuals, "young people make up the highest proportion of renters, which stands at 27 percent." There is only a small portion of young Hungarians, mostly living in bigger cities, who do not want to own an apartment or house.

(9) Ágnes Engler and Gabriella Pusztai delved into the ninth most critical problem, which was family life. For Hungarian young people, family holds significant importance. However, in recent years, uncertainties have arisen around relationships and planning for children due to various factors. These factors include the decline in marriage and family planning, the breakdown of family structures, and common anxieties in the lives of youth. The authors propose supporting small communities and implementing public family allowances as potential solutions.

(10) Georgina Kiss-Kozma and Tamás Ruff examined emigration in the final chapter. Young people typically represent the most mobile age group; although the majority of young Hungarians do not currently have migration plans, they are most likely to consider it in the future. One of the primary influences on young people's opinions and plans is their own and their acquaintances' past experiences with emigration. Hungary witnessed a significant wave of emigration until 2015, but in the subsequent years, there was an increasing number of migrations both into and out of the country.

Péter Pillók – Levente Székely: Kívánj tizet!. A magyarországi fiatalok nemzedéki önreflexiója és jövőképe. Budapest: National Youth Council of Hungary, 2022

The Impact of Crises on Youth

Paul Moran[1]

Today's youth have experienced hard times unlike any since the Second World War. After COVID-19, society, and especially young people, are in need of answers to regain momentum.

A book like *Hard Times Create Strong Youth* provides solutions for youth to realize and regain their momentum by examining the present situation, analyzing past situations, and how these were overcome. The book's editors, Péter Pillók and Levente Székely, have a deep understanding of how recent crises like the recessions of 2008 and 2011 and the COVID-19 pandemic have caused psychological and economic damage to the youth populations of nearly every country on earth. A fear of the unknown connects with every crisis. Pillók and Székely term this unknown fear "nomos." "Accepting that these are phases or events of socialization, we can ask how the construction of reality happens in each phase and what the instruments of creating 'nomos,' the preventive factor against the fear of the unknown adulthood" (Székely & Pillók, 2023:10). This unknown fear can cause a type of trauma that constrains all of society, but especially youth.

To demonstrate this point, the book outlines several distinct crises, the response to these, and how they were resolved. The first category of crisis analyzed were the three economic crises of the 21st century: the housing crisis of 2008, the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, and the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. Studies showed that the economic position of youth following these crises was largely reflective of the population at large. Various measures were used for evaluating effects of the housing crisis, an example being the share of adults between 18-34 living with their parents ranging from 16 percent in Denmark to 77 percent in Croatia. Furthermore, a distinction is made between the independent-minded and financially well-off Scandinavian model, the more traditional and less economically stable Southern European model, and the French / German model somewhere in the middle.

Another aspect highlighted in this work is the fear and uncertainty produced by the recent world crises. Fear of the unknown also leads to collective trauma, a concept that has taken on new dimensions due to the COVID-19 epidemic. "The authors believe that as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the post-pandemic period, the youth may also develop a collective personality rooted in collective generational trauma" (Székely & Pillók, 2023:82). The authors have also used Maslow's pyramid of needs to gauge what youth need in today's post-Covid world. Interestingly, the analysis determines that youth in the developed world today face less risk than youth did in the past. "Looking at what is happening today and the surrounding discourse, we can sense that man in the 21st century is living in an era of uncertainty. However, our world, and especially the so-called developed world, is relatively risk-free by historical standards" (Székely & Pillók, 2023:63). Thus, while youth in the developed world may be more physically secure than they realize, the

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authors suggest that the greater burden may be psychological.

This psychological state is defined as "The Crisis of Security and Predictability." Using the GPI (Global Peace Index), it was corroborated that youth feel generally safer and more secure in the West (especially the Nordic countries) than they do in the East (especially Africa). Such findings show that a sense of peace and prosperity, or lack thereof, has great effects on the mental and emotional well-being of youth. Again, the research found universal similarities in youth reporting fear and uncertainty, despite their geographical location. The studies used in this book show that youth in all countries that were examined feel a greater sense of fear and uncertainty when compared to pre-COVID years.

Besides recent wars and pandemics, the issue of climate change is addressed. Generation Z was the main focus as they are characteristically more active in the climate change cause than other generations, primarily exemplified by Greta Thunberg. This study of climate change started in 2018 (beginning with Thunberg) and spans to the present day looking at the media coverage of the phenomena as well. The authors recognize that Gen Z may be more vocal about cause due to the greater likelihood of them living with climate change if it continues to be an issue in the future. Pillók and Székely also note that the majority of visible climate change activists are young, well-to-do white women. Furthermore, the emergence of climate change anxiety as a yet-to-be-diagnosed condition is also discussed.

Building on the theme of social problems, the set of studies also deals with the crisis of communities falling apart as well as the possibility of false conspiracy theories indoctrinating youth. The authors determined that countries with lower levels of trust in public institutions also report higher levels of community involvement.

Western Europeans are more likely to trust public institutions, while those in the East (often with more recent histories of authoritarianism) report lower levels of trust. The authors determined that post-socialist nations have populations who remember the tyranny and corruption of past governments and are less willing to trust current institutions, with youth being no exception to this distrust. Likewise, the authors have determined similar conclusions about conspiracy theories -- that a fundamental lack of trust in elites and powerbrokers has encouraged many to seek information from alternate sources. Extreme positions, morally and politically, as well as moral relativism are linked to conspiracy theorists. Youth are also observed gravitating toward conspiracy theories, with a call for expanded research on how and why people become conspiracy theorists.

The compilation of studies also includes a section emphasizing the importance of youth being leaders through new means of technology. They have a clear understanding that in an ever-evolving world, transforming mediums to affect change are not only available but are only as effective as people use them. The volume explains how the current generation of youth relies on technology not only for convenience but also for social causes important to them. The study acknowledges that with increasing use of technology, there also come deeply divided results concerning positive and negative outcomes. The use of technology has caused Generation Z to mature at a different pace. Time will tell the full extent of the identity that Gen Z will assume through its extensive use of technology.

Lastly, *Hard Times Create Strong Youth* contains thoughtful analyses of the difficulties of truly defining generations in very clear terms. Pillók and Székely note that not everyone defines themselves or associates with the generation based on when they were born. The work argues

for a new concept of defining generations based on updated criteria such as the use and application of technology.

In conclusion, *Hard Times Create Strong Youth* is essential for all youths and those looking to understand them -- especially after the COVID-19 crisis and in the ongoing Ukrainian and Israeli / Palestinian conflicts. Youth identity is examined in societies throughout the world, with a focus also on young immigrants to Europe from less-developed nations. This book highlights not only how today's youth have gotten where they are, but how to move forward and avoid the same mistakes of the past and previous generations. With practical advice and analysis provided in this work, the youth of today and those around them will have a greater understanding of how to cope with "hard times."

Péter Pillók – Levente Székely: Hard times create strong youth. *The Impact of the Era of Crisis on Future Generations. Budapest: National Youth Council of Hungary, 2023*

Author resumes

Admilson Veloso

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Tamás Ruff is a sociologist. At the beginning of his career, he worked as a fieldwork manager and research director for a sociological research institute in Székesfehérvár for 20 years. His main research interests focus on the sociology of youth, specifically in relation to emigration and the labour market. He is currently an assistant lecturer at the Kodolányi János University as well as a PhD student at the István Széchenyi Economics and Management Doctoral School at the University of Sopron.

Georgina Kiss - Kozma

Georgina Kiss-Kozma defended her doctoral thesis (PhD) with summa cum laude at the Doctoral School of Political Theory of Pázmány Péter Catholic University. She is Head of Research at the Youth Research Institute and researcher teacher at the Center for Sociology at Mathias Corvinus Collegium. She is also a member of the editorial board of the Youth and Generation Studies.

Virág Rédai

Virág Rédai holds a bachelor's degree in commerce and marketing from the Budapest Business School and a master's degree in communication and media science from Corvinus University of Budapest. She acts as Co-CEO of a Hungarian social startup focused on talent management and also works as a communication specialist at L'Oréal Groupe. Her research interests are youth communication, employer branding, and leadership development.

István Murányi

István Murányi earned his Ph.D. in 2005 with a focus on political socialization and youth sociology within the Department of Economic and Legal Sciences at Debrecen University. Currently working as a professor, his research interests include prejudice, identity, and political socialization. He is an active member of several Hungarian sociological committees and has contributed to hundreds of scholarly publications.